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Abstract 
We analyze whether firms that receive Venture Capital (VC) at a later date face 
more financial constraints than a one-by-one matched sample of firms that did not receive 
VC funding (control group). The aim is to check whether their financial flexibility explains 
why they decide to seek external equity funding. In contrast with other papers, which focus 
on the sensitivity of investments to cash flow, we study this issue by applying a dynamic 
model to analyze the speed of adjustment to their target debt levels prior to receiving the 
first VC investment. We analyze a representative sample of 237 Spanish unlisted firms that 
received VC between 1995 and 2007 and its corresponding control group. We find that 
firms that receive VC funding show a significantly lower speed of adjustment than their 
matched peers before the initial VC round. It seems that the former are more concerned 
about funding the required investments than about adjusting the firm’s debt ratio to a target 
level. Our results confirm the role of VC in filling the equity gap in constrained unlisted 
firms. From a capital structure perspective, VC may become a tool for these companies to 
balance their capital structure in a growth process. 
Keywords: venture capital, capital structure, financial constraints, adjustment speed, 
growth opportunities. 
JEL classification: G32, G24. 
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1.  Introduction 
The venture capital (VC) literature has deeply analyzed supply-side issues that justify 
the role played by VC firms (e.g., Sahlman 1990; Amit et al. 1998; Bessler and Kurth 
2007; Reid et al. 2010), as well as the main firm characteristics that are found to be 
attractive to venture capitalists (VCs)(e.g., Tyebjee and Bruno 1984; Fried and Hisrich 
1994). However, there is little research on the financial characteristics of firms that 
induce them to search for VC (Baeyens and Manigart 2006). The main reason for 
prospective investee firms to access VC funding is the lack of financial resources to 
fund their investment projects. Hence, it is expected that those firms are more 
financially constrained before the initial round completed by a VC firm (i.e., before 
receiving treatment). This feature has been evidenced in the VC literature by focusing 
on the significant sensitivity of investments to cash flows before the initial VC round 
(e.g., Manigart et al. 2002; Bertoni et al. 2010, 2013; Engel and Stiebale 2014). There is 
even evidence on the reduction of financial constraints in those firms after the initial VC 
round (Bertoni et al. 2013; Engel and Stiebale 2014). However, there is methodological 
controversy in the literature on the relationship between financial constraints and 
investment-cash flow sensitivity. Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000), Kadapakkam et al. 
(1998) or Cleary (1999, 2006) show that least financially constrained firms may also 
exhibit greater investment-cash flow sensitivity. Later studies indicate that the source of 
these mixed results lies, among others, in the disagreement among researchers in 
identifying appropriate factors to segregate more financially constrained firms from less 
constrained ones (Moyen 2004; Cleary et al. 2007), the fact that the variables used to 
define financial constraints are time invariant (Hubbard 1998), or the lack of a proper 
control for the investment opportunities (Alti 2003). 
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In this work we aim to provide further support to the evidence on whether VC-
backed firms are more financially constrained than a matched sample of non VC-backed 
firms before receiving treatment by using a new approach: the study of the dynamic 
behavior of leverage prior to the initial VC round. We resort to a new strand in the 
literature on capital structure that relates financial constraints to the speed of adjustment 
to a target debt ratio (e.g., Flannery and Rangan 2006; Flannery and Hankins 2007; 
Byoun, 2008; Dang et al. 2012; Faulkender et al. 2012; Öztekin and Flannery 2012; 
Drobetz et al. 2014). Under certain circumstances, financially constrained firms show a 
slow speed of adjustment to their target debt levels (López-Gracia and Sogorb-Mira 
2008; Faulkender et al. 2012; Öztekin and Flannery 2012). We argue that firms 
accessing VC funding are financially constrained and should show a slow speed of 
adjustment prior to receiving VC. To the best of our knowledge, this issue has not been 
previously addressed in the VC literature. 
The analysis is based on a sample of Spanish unlisted firms at the expansion 
stage that received the initial VC investment during the period from 1995 to 2007. Our 
analyses are also carried out on a one-by-one matched sample of firms that did not 
receive VC (the control group, hereafter). In order to analyze the dynamic behavior of 
leverage, we use a target adjustment model where the target debt ratio is estimated as a 
linear function of the determinants of leverage proposed in the literature on capital 
structure. Given the dynamic process found in firm leverage, the estimations are based 
on the Generalized Method of Moments estimator developed by Blundell and Bond 
(1998). The use of this technique allows us to address the autoregressive process found 
in the debt ratio and the fact that the explanatory variables, including the lagged value of 
the debt ratio, are potentially endogenous. The results show that firms that receive VC 
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later adjust to their target debt ratio more slowly than other similar untreated firms, 
providing evidence on the existence of financial constraints on the former. 
This work contributes to the literature on entrepreneurial finance in several 
ways. First, we provide evidence on the existence of significant financial constraints in 
firms that later on access VC funding using an alternative methodology, thus helping to 
explain why high-growth companies raise VC funding in a European context. Second, 
this is the first paper that analyzes the dynamic perspective of capital structure in 
unlisted companies that were later subject to a VC investment and provides further 
evidence on the role that VC firms play to fill the equity gap in unlisted firms. Third, we 
provide firm evidence on the difference in the dynamic behavior of leverage in 
companies that are later financed by VC investors when compared with that of similar 
companies that did not obtain VC funding. Finally, we focus on a demand side 
perspective of the VC market, which is frequently neglected in the literature on 
entrepreneurial finance. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section two we survey the 
theoretical literature on which we ground our hypothesis. Section three describes the 
sample and the methodology. The results are presented in Section four. Further 
robustness checks are developed in Section five. In Section six we discuss the results 
and conclude. 
2.   Financial constraints, venture capital and the capital structure adjustment 
process 
2.1.  Financial constraints and the sensitivity of investments to cash flow 
In imperfect capital markets investment decisions are not independent from 
financing decisions (Modigliani and Miller 1958) due to the existence of frictions such 
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as information asymmetry, agency costs and transaction costs (Jensen and Meckling 
1976; Fama and Jensen 1983; Myers and Majluf 1984). These frictions affect the firms’ 
capacity of accessing external sources of funds. As a consequence, the investment 
pattern of firms could be conditioned by the availability of internally generated funds 
(Jorgenson 1963; Hall and Jorgenson 1967). Some firms are not that much affected 
whereas others are heavily constrained, and basically rely on their capacity to raise 
funds internally to finance their investments.  
The range of financial sources available is not the same for listed and unlisted 
firms. In addition to their internally generated funds, listed firms are able to issue shares 
and have easier access than unlisted firms to the debt market (Vanacker and Manigart 
2010). Listed firms are required to provide periodic reliable information about their past 
operations and future projects, are usually larger in size and have more tangible assets to 
pledge as collateral. Conversely, unlisted firms are only required to publish an annual 
report, their size is also smaller and have fewer assets to use as collateral, and are rarely 
monitored by analysts or rating agencies (González and González 2012). As a result, 
they are most affected by information asymmetry problems when accessing external 
sources of funds to finance their investment projects (Berger and Udell 1998; Brav 
2009), and there is substantial difference between the cost of internal and external funds 
in those firms (Myers and Majluf 1984; Carpenter and Petersen 2002). Hence, unlisted 
firms are expected to be more financially constrained than listed ones (Guariglia 2008), 
and may forgo their growth opportunities when internal funds are insufficient to finance 
investments (Gompers 1995; Michaelas et al. 1999). 
Several contributions in the literature try to provide a reliable measure for the 
existence of financial constraints. The seminal paper by Fazzari et al. (1988) maintains 
that financially constrained firms show a positive dependency between investments and 
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cash flow. Their article was followed by others that apply similar methodologies on 
different classifications of constrained and unconstrained firms (e.g., see Hubbard 1998 
for a review). But this approach has raised a lot of criticism in the literature. Based on a 
subsample of the sample used by Fazzari et al. (1988), Kaplan and Zingales (1997) 
demonstrate that firms with low dividend payouts are not necessarily financially 
constrained. Other works support their findings (e.g., Kadapakkam et al. 1998; Cleary 
1999, 2006; Almeida and Campello 2007). Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000) maintain 
that the profit-maximizing investment choices of firms do not imply a monotonic 
relationship between financial constraints and the dependency of investments to cash 
flow. A positive relationship between investments and cash flow could also be present 
in unconstrained firms whose managers misuse the firm’s free cash flow (Jensen 1986).  
The existence of mixed results could be caused by the lack of agreement among 
researchers on the appropriate factors to segregate more financially constrained firms 
from less constrained ones (Moyen 2004; Cleary et al. 2007), the fact that the variables 
used to define financial constraints are time invariant (Hubbard 1998), or the lack of a 
proper control for investment opportunities (Alti 2003). Regarding the classification 
issue, overinvestment should be more common in large firms whereas underinvestment 
should be more frequently present in smaller firms (Vogt 1994). In this line, a positive 
relationship between investments and cash flow signals the existence of binding 
financial constraints in small and young unlisted firms, which are most affected by 
information asymmetry problems (Carpenter and Petersen 2002). As regards the control 
for investment opportunities, new methodologies, such as the Euler equation approach 
(Bond and Meghir 1994) and the error correction model (Bond et al. 2003; Guariglia 
2008), have been introduced to address the concerns raised by the original 
methodologies. In sum, the question on whether the existence of financial constraints is 
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adequately reflected by the sensitivity of investments to cash flows is still an open area 
of research. 
2.2.  Financial constraints and the capital structure adjustment process in unlisted 
firms 
A different perspective to identify the existence of financial constraints emerges 
from the literature about capital structure theories. Since the eighties several theories 
have been proposed to explain the firm’s financial behavior, with the most established 
ones being the static trade-off and the pecking order theories.
1
 The former states that 
firms balance the advantages and disadvantages of debt in establishing their capital 
structure, leading to the existence of an optimum level of debt (Bradley et al. 1984). 
Among the advantages we should highlight tax shields (Modigliani and Miller 1963; 
Mackie-Mason 1990; Graham 1996) and the mitigation of agency free cash flow 
problems (Jensen 1986), while among the disadvantages we should recall bankruptcy 
costs (Kraus and Litzenberger 1973) and agency conflicts (Jensen and Meckling 1976; 
Myers 1977). However, due to market imperfections firms cannot achieve this optimum 
and therefore aim to rebalance their capital structure in an attempt to reach that level. 
On the contrary, the pecking order theory (Myers 1984; Myers and Majluf 1984), which 
is based on the existence of information asymmetries, establishes that firms follow a 
hierarchy in the use of funds with the aim of minimizing the financing costs. Therefore, 
internally generated funds are preferred to external ones and risky debt to equity. Under 
the pecking order theory there is not an optimum level of debt, which would then 
depend, in each period, on the profitability and investment opportunities of the firm.  
There is ample empirical evidence on both theories in the literature (Shyam-
Sunder and Myers 1999; Frank and Goyal 2008). These contributions are enriched by 
the evidence on the trade-off theory in a dynamic context, according to which leverage 
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follows an adjustment process towards a target leverage ratio. While some papers find 
evidence of the trade-off theory (e.g., Jalilvand and Harris 1984; Fischer et al. 1989; De 
Miguel and Pindado 2001; Hovakimian et al. 2001; Ozkan 2001; Flannery and Rangan 
2006; Lemmon et al. 2008; Huang and Ritter, 2009), others prove that the pecking order 
theory is able to explain better the firm’s financing behavior (Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
1999; Watson and Wilson 2002). Some studies also find that there are mixed effects 
from both theories (Fama and French 2002; Frank and Goyal 2003).  
In the case of Spanish unlisted firms, there is evidence in favor of the pecking 
order theory (e.g., see Sánchez-Vidal and Martín-Ugedo 2005; Cardone and Cazorla 
2006). However, some of these studies build on the methodology presented by Shyam-
Sunder and Myers (1999), which is criticized by Chirinko and Singha (2000) as a valid 
test of the pecking order theory. In addition, the negative relationship between 
profitability and debt, which is found in those articles, could also be expected in a 
dynamic trade-off framework (Strebulaev 2007). This result is supported by González 
and González (2012) and López-Gracia and Sogorb-Mira (2008). They provide 
evidence that Spanish unlisted firms show an adjustment process to the target ratio and 
at the same time exhibit a negative relationship between debt and profitability and a 
positive relationship between debt and growth opportunities, thus providing support to 
both theories. This result is especially robust in the case of small unlisted firms 
(González and González 2012). Accordingly, as Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and 
Chen and Zhao (2005) argue, the reversion process of the leverage ratio can also be 
observed even if the pecking order theory holds.  
Since access to long-term debt, equity and VC markets is very limited in Europe 
for small firms (Guariglia 2008), the only alternative to finance growth is frequently 
short-term debt. Hence, the firm’s ability to move towards the target debt ratio would be 
 8 
 
 
conditioned by the decision to delay rebalancing the capital structure, or by the 
reconsideration of undertaking the firm’s investment projects (Campello et al. 2010). In 
this way, there is a strand in the capital structure literature that relates the speed of 
adjustment to the target debt ratio to the existence of financial constraints. Faulkender et 
al. (2012) posit that the adjustment process may differ in constrained and unconstrained 
firms. Dang et al. (2012) find that the speed of adjustment is faster for firms with large 
investments, but recognize that this finding is against the prediction that firms investing 
more should have a slow speed of adjustment. Regarding Spanish unlisted firms, López-
Gracia and Sogorb-Mira (2008) find that SMEs are more financially constrained and 
show a slower speed of adjustment than large firms. 
2.3.  Venture capital funding and the capital structure adjustment process 
The speed of adjustment towards a target in unlisted growing firms may be 
driven by the lower financial flexibility that these firms face. We argue that unlisted 
irms that are willing to invest to take advantage of their growth opportunities are 
financially constrained. They will try to access any available external source of 
financing. Since access to equity is very limited, especially in Europe (Guariglia 2008), 
they will basically resort to (short-term) debt. As a result, these firms will focus on 
growth rather than on adjusting their debt ratio to a target. In contrast, firms that forgo 
their growth opportunities, by delaying their planned investments, are able to adjust 
their capital structure faster. Hence, in the case on unlisted firms, which are more 
financially constrained than listed firms (López-Gracia and Sogorb-Mira 2008), those 
that are investing heavily should show a slow speed of adjustment. 
In this context, we argue that firms access VC funding, which provides funds in 
the form of equity or quasi-equity to unlisted firms exhibiting outstanding growth 
opportunities, to re-balance their capital structure and undertake their planned 
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investments. There is evidence on the higher debt levels of investee firms prior to the 
initial VC round. Balboa et al. (2012) find that Spanish VC-backed firms exhibit greater 
growth opportunities, but also greater debt ratios, than similar firms that do not have 
access to VC funding, before the initial VC round. Engel and Stiebale (2014) argue that 
firms selected by VCs may be characterized by different debt levels. Baeyens and 
Manigart (2006) also find that VC-backed companies have higher debt ratios than their 
non VC-backed counterparts before the initial investment event. This could probably 
lead to a reduction in their financial flexibility. Hence, the equity injection made by a 
VC firm would provide additional resources and rebalance the capital structure. 
There is evidence on the presence of more severe financial constraints in VC-
backed firms than in non VC-backed ones before the initial VC investment. This has 
been evidenced by the existence of a significant sensitivity of investments to cash flow 
in firms before receiving VC, which is based on different methodologies and on 
samples from Belgium (Manigart et al. 2002), Italy and Spain (Bertoni et al. 2010, 
2013), and France and the UK (Engel and Stiebale 2014). Since there is a debate on the 
validity of testing the existence of financial constraints by analyzing the investment-
cash flow sensitivity, we will provide further evidence on this issue by focusing on an 
alternative methodology: the speed of adjustment towards a target debt ratio. According 
to Flannery and Hankins (2007), financial constraints affect the rebalancing costs
2
 and, 
therefore, the speed of adjustment towards the target. Dang et al. (2012) are the first to 
propose an approach that consistently estimates heterogeneous speeds of adjustments. 
The following hypothesis follows from this discussion: 
VC-backed companies exhibit a slower speed of adjustment to the target before 
the initial VC investment event than similar firms that do not obtain VC funding. 
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3.  Data and methodology 
3.1.  Data and sample selection 
The data used in the analysis are based on a sample of Spanish unlisted firms. 
The period analyzed covers initial VC investments reported from 1995 until 2007. 
According to the Spanish Venture Capital Association (ASCRI) and 
www.webcapitalriesgo.com, during this period 2,651 companies were subject to a 
private equity investment in Spain, including both VC and late stage deals but excluding 
investments in financial and real estate sectors. We were able to fully identify 2,110 
companies backed with private equity, once duplicated firms (i.e. those affected by 
syndication and those invested by other investors in previous years) are excluded. Of 
these companies, 1,063 were initially funded at the seed or start-up stages, 779 were at 
the expansion stage and 268 belonged to the buyout and other late stages category.  
We focus the analysis on companies that were at the expansion stage
3
 at the 
moment of receiving the VC investment for two reasons. First, we analyze the behavior 
of the capital structure before the VC investment event. Therefore, firms at the early 
stages are excluded because most of them are newly-born and there are not enough data 
available to analyze this period. Second, we do not include companies at late stages 
because we are interested in analyzing the dynamic behavior of the debt ratio in firms 
that are supposed to suffer most from information asymmetry problems, as stated in the 
previous section, which is not the case in most mature firms. 
We found accounting data on 757 VC-backed companies at the expansion stage 
in the AMADEUS Database.
4
 We tried to match each VC-backed firm, one-by-one, 
with comparable companies not receiving VC funding. Comparable firms were 
randomly chosen from the AMADEUS Database, matching the sector, by means of the 
European Classification of Economic Activities (NACE) Rev2 code (4-digit code), the 
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number of employees, the revenues, the asset volumes, the age and the location.
5
 All 
these characteristics were matched in the year before the initial VC investment (i.e., 
year T). We were able to identify a valid comparable firm for 605 firms that were later 
subject to a VC investment. 
Nevertheless, the estimation process described in the following subsection 
requires data on at least six consecutive years to define instrumental variables efficiently 
(De Miguel and Pindado 2001; Gaud et al. 2005). We selected only those firms for 
which we have accounting data from T at least until T-5, with T being the year before 
the focal firm received the first VC round. Since some firms were not old enough at the 
time of the initial investment, this requirement reduced our sample of VC-backed 
companies at the expansion stage to 237 firms, representing 30.4 per cent of the 
population of companies at that stage and 39.2 per cent of the sample of VC-backed 
firms for which we were able to identify a comparable non VC-backed firm at the same 
stage. Our dataset also includes 237 comparable control group firms that meet the same 
data requirement. 
We expect the impact of any survival bias to be limited because we focus on the 
pre-investment period, in which all VC-backed firms were obviously alive. Therefore, a 
positive survival bias could only marginally affect the control group firms, because the 
AMADEUS database deletes data on firms that disappear, albeit several years later. To 
mitigate this effect further, we randomly searched for comparable firms in old DVDs 
provided by AMADEUS when matching investments of the mid-nineties and those 
carried out around year 2000.  
The sources of data about VC activity are ASCRI and 
www.webcapitalriesgo.com. The accounting data were taken from the Official Trade 
Registers and from the AMADEUS Database. 
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Panel A of Table 1 shows mean values for sales, headcount, total assets and age 
for the population of VC-backed companies at the expansion stage and also for those 
firms finally included in the sample. With the exception of age
6
 no significant 
differences are found for all variables. Therefore, the sample can confidently be 
considered as representative of the population. Panel B shows the same descriptive 
statistics but for the sample of firms that were later subject to a VC investment and the 
corresponding control group included in the sample. It is important to highlight that the 
mean values for all variables in both groups were not statistically different in the year 
before the initial VC investment (i.e., the year of matching, T), thus showing a 
successful matching process based on all these characteristics. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
3.2.  Model and methodology 
The adjustment process of the debt ratio can be represented by a partial target 
adjustment model (De Miguel and Pindado 2001; Flannery and Rangan 2006; López-
Gracia and Sogorb-Mira 2008). The form of the model shows that changes in the debt 
ratio (𝐷𝑖𝑡 − 𝐷𝑖𝑡−1) partially absorb the difference between the target level and the 
previous debt ratio (𝐷𝑖𝑡
∗ − 𝐷𝑖𝑡−1): 
   DD DD
1it
*
it1itit 
  (1) 
where 
it
D  and 
1it
D

 are the debt levels in the current and the previous period, 
respectively, *
t
D  is the company’s target debt level and 
7
 measures the speed of 
adjustment. The adjustment costs
8
 are inversely related to   and can be represented as 
1  (López-Gracia and Sogorb-Mira 2008). In this line, if   is zero the adjustment 
costs are very high and the company never adjusts its debt level to reach the target 
(𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝐷𝑖𝑡−1). On the contrary, if   is equal to one there are no adjustment costs and 
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the company automatically reaches its target level ( *
itit
DD  ). Thus, if firms follow an 
adjustment process to reach their target debt level, then the coefficient   should have a 
positive value between 0 and 1. This implies a dynamic behavior where a firm adjusts 
its debt level towards the target according to the value of transaction costs. 
According to (1), the actual level of debt is determined by: 
  
1it
*
itit
D1DD

    (2) 
In this equation, it should be highlighted that the target debt level is unknown 
and should be estimated. While in some works the target is externally determined 
(Jalilvand and Harris 1984; Shyam-Sunder and Myers 1999), most studies estimate this 
target through a regression that incorporates the determinants of the capital structure 
shown in the previous section of this paper as explanatory variables (e.g., see De Miguel 
and Pindado 2001; Flannery and Rangan 2006; López-Gracia and Sogorb-Mira 2008; 
González and González 2012). The latter approach is the one considered in this paper, 
with the target being estimated by the following model: 
*
it
D  = F (Tangibility, Size, Profitability, Volatility, Growth opportunities,  
Effective tax paid)  (3) 
Our baseline model, represented by equation (4), incorporates equation (3) into 
equation (2) and adds the interaction of the lagged value of the debt ratio with a dummy 
variable (VC) that is equal to 1 in firms that later receive VC, or 0 otherwise. 
𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑉𝐶 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑖𝑡−1𝑉𝐶 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡𝑕𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡                                       4   
The endogenous variable (𝐷𝑖𝑡 ) is the ratio between long- plus short-term interest 
bearing debt
9
 and total assets for each firm and year, as in Ozkan (2001), Lemmon et al. 
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(2008), Hovakimian and Li (2011, 2012), or González and González (2012). Flannery 
and Rangan (2006) use the same numerator but the denominator is the book value of 
interest bearing debt plus the market value of equity in listed firms. Our measure of the 
debt ratio is widely used in capital structure literature (Rajan and Zingales 1995; 
Hovakimian et al. 2004), and especially in the case of unlisted firms (e.g., see Cassar 
2004; Chittenden et al. 1996; Michaelas et al. 1999). 
In addition to the dummy VC and its interaction with 𝐷𝑖𝑡−1, we include as 
independent variables the main determinants of the debt ratio. In their review, Harris 
and Raviv (1991) argue that there is a general consensus about the determinants that 
affect the capital structure of the firm, including factors such as tangible fixed assets, 
size-probability of default, profitability, volatility, growth opportunities, tax effects, 
marketing expenditures, research and development expenditures and the specificity of 
the product. In our empirical analysis we will consider all these characteristics except 
those of marketing, research and development expenditures, and the specificity of the 
product because of unavailability of data. The definition of the variables is as follows. 
𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡  is the ratio between tangible fixed assets and total assets (e.g., see Rajan and 
Zingales 1995; Hovakimian et al. 2001; Frank and Goyal 2003; Flannery and Rangan 
2006). 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡  represents the size of the firm each year. It is measured by the natural 
logarithm of total assets, as in Titman and Wessels (1988), Hovakimian et al. (2001), 
Fama and French (2002) and Flannery and Rangan (2006), among others. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡  
measures the profitability for each firm and year. It is defined as the ratio between 
earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) and total assets (e.g., De Miguel and Pindado 
2001; Fama and French 2002; Frank and Goyal 2003; Sogorb-Mira 2005; Flannery and 
Rangan 2006). 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡  is a measure of volatility for each firm and year. Following Balboa 
et al. (2012), it is defined as a moving standard deviation computing the changes in 
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EBIT of the current and the previous two years. 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡𝑕𝑖𝑡  measures growth 
opportunities for each firm and year. As in Michaelas et al. (1999), we use the ratio 
between intangible assets and total assets. 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡  is the effective corporate tax paid for 
each firm and year. It is computed as the ratio between effective corporate tax paid and 
the earnings before tax, as suggested by Ozkan (2000) and López-Gracia and Sogorb-
Mira (2008). We also develop several robustness checks with alternative definitions 
found in the literature. 
The model also includes additional control variables. First, we include an 
industry variable representing the median leverage per year for each group (Lemmon et 
al. 2008; Frank and Goyal 2009) to control for industry effects in the regression 
analysis, as is recommended in the literature (e.g., Scott and Martin 1975; Ferri and 
Jones 1979; Bowen et al. 1982; Bradley et al. 1984; Mackay and Phillips 2005). 
Second, all models include time year dummies in order to control for possible time 
effects on the leverage ratio. Finally, 𝜂𝑖  represents the specific unobservable individual 
effects for each company, which do not vary over time, and 𝜇𝑖𝑡  is an error term. 
The coefficient 𝛽1 measures the adjustment costs of control group firms whereas 
𝛼 = 1 − 𝛽1 represents the speed of adjustment in those firms. In the case of the sample 
of firms that later receive VC 𝛽1 + 𝛽3 represents the adjustment costs, and the speed of 
adjustment is 1 − 𝛽1−𝛽3. In our results we expect a positive and significant coefficient 
for 𝛽3, which implies a significantly lower speed of adjustment of firms that later 
receive VC. 
The expected signs of the remaining independent variables, which are reported 
in the tables that show our estimates, are as follows. First, the coefficient of Tangit   (𝛽4) 
should be positive and significant because tangible fixed assets preserve most of their 
value in case of liquidation (Wald 1999), and the empirical evidence strongly supports 
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this view (e.g., see Titman and Wessels 1988; Mackie-Mason 1990; Prowse 1990; 
Jensen et al. 1992; Smith and Watts 1992; Hovakimian et al. 2001; Frank and Goyal 
2003). Second, since the size of the company is negatively related to the probability of 
default (Titman and Wessels 1988; Rajan and Zingales 1995; Fama and French 2002; 
Frank and Goyal 2003), a positive relationship between Sizeitand Dit  (represented by 
the coefficient 𝛽5) is expected (e.g., Titman and Wessels 1988; Hovakimian et al. 2001; 
Frank and Goyal 2003; Rajan and Zingales 1995; Cassar 2004). Third, profitable 
companies are expected to have a high level of debt because one of the advantages of 
debt derives from the tax deductibility of interest payments (Modigliani and Miller 
1963). However, more profitable companies may prefer to finance investments 
internally. Hence, either a positive or a negative relationship could be found, depending 
on the preeminence of the static trade-off theory or the pecking order theory. However, 
the dynamic trade-off theory also predicts a negative relationship between profitability 
and debt (Strebulaev 2007). Furthermore, in the case of small and medium sized firms, 
or privately held companies, there is firm evidence of a negative relationship between 
profitability and the debt ratio (Sogorb-Mira 2005; Heyman et al. 2008; López-Gracia 
and Sogorb-Mira 2008). Therefore, in our work we predict a negative coefficient for 𝛽6. 
Fourth, companies with high earnings volatility are expected to raise lower debt because 
earnings could fall below the level of debt. Hence, we agree with Titman and Wessels 
(1988) that there should be a negative relationship between Volit  and Dit  (represented by 
𝛽7), which is widely accepted in the literature (e.g., Harris and Raviv 1991; Michaelas 
et al. 1999; Fama and French 2002). Fifth, according to Wald (1999) companies with 
high-growth opportunities have more potential to carry out future investments, and this 
situation could give rise to agency conflicts whereby shareholders expropriate value 
from bondholders. Therefore, the relationship between debt and growth opportunities 
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should apparently be negative (Myers 1977; Bradley et al. 1984). However, Michaelas 
et al. (1999) point out that companies with high growth opportunities should use debt 
since the internal funds generated would not be enough to finance their growth. Thus, in 
our context we anticipate a positive value for the coefficient of Growthit  (𝛽8). Finally, 
since firms that pay higher taxes could benefit more from tax shields, which is 
supported in the literature (e.g., Graham 1996; Michaelas et al. 1999), we predict a 
positive relationship between ETRit  and Dit  (represented by 𝛽9). 
We use a dynamic model to represent firm leverage behavior, which requires the 
use of the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)in the estimation process. The 
estimations are carried out using the Blundell and Bond (1998) GMM estimator for 
panel data, which employs additional moment conditions based on first differences (in 
addition to the levels) to increase the efficiency of the estimation. The use of GMM is 
the adequate methodology when the data shows an autoregressive process (see the debt 
ratio in equation 4) and there is a potential endogeneity problem in the explanatory 
variables. 
Two tests are carried out to check for a possible mis-specification of the model. 
The first is the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions, which confirms the validity 
of the instruments used by checking the absence of correlation between the instruments 
used in the estimation and the error term. The second test examines the hypothesis of a 
serially uncorrelated error, since consistent estimations are only obtained if this is the 
case. In a dynamic model, such as the one estimated here, where differences of the 
variables are taken to remove the unobserved individual effects in the estimation of the 
model, this condition is verified if there is a lack of second order serial correlation in the 
first difference residuals. 
 18 
 
 
3.3.  Descriptive statistics 
In Panels A and B of Table 2 we find that companies that receive VC later are 
more indebted. Panel A shows that both the mean and median values for the total debt 
ratio are significantly higher for firms that receive VC later than for firms in the control 
group. Nevertheless, both groups are not significantly different in age
10
 or size, as 
reported in Table 1. This result is in line with Baeyens and Manigart (2006). Panel B 
also reports that debt ratios show a slightly increasing pattern prior to the entry of the 
VC investor (which could mean that the internally generated funds are insufficient to 
back up subsequent growth) in firms that receive VC later, whereas the ratios for control 
group firms are overly similar over time. A possible reason for the continuous growth 
found in the debt ratios for firms that later receive VC could be related to the fact that 
these firms may not be able to rebalance their capital structure very quickly, because 
they are in a growth process and try to use all sources of funds available.  
Regarding the variables related to the target debt ratio, Panel C of Table 2 shows 
several descriptive statistics for the whole sample and the subsamples of companies that 
either receive VC or not. The significant differences on tangibility, profitability, growth 
opportunities and effective taxes paid between both groups could imply a different 
investment and financing behavior among them.  
Insert Table 2 about here 
Pairwise correlations among all variables are shown in Table 3. There does not 
seem to be any concern about the correlation among the explanatory variables. 
Nevertheless, in Section 4 we exclude some of the variables showing potential 
colinearity problems (i.e., tangible fixed assets and intangible fixed assets) and in 
Section 5 we perform further robustness checks by providing alternative definitions for 
some variables according to the literature on capital structure. 
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Insert Table 3 about here 
4. Results 
In Table 4 we show the results obtained on the speed of adjustment for sample 
and control group firms. Model 1 reports the coefficients on our baseline model but 
excluding the interaction between VC and the lagged debt ratio (i.e., it does not 
disentangle among firms that received VC later and their matched peers). The 
adjustment cost (i.e., 𝛽1) for all firms is 0.5011, significant at the 1% confidence level. 
This implies a speed of adjustment of 0.4989. Regarding the standard determinants of 
the debt ratio, size, profitability and the proxy for growth opportunities have significant 
coefficients in all regressions whereas tangible fixed assets and volatility are significant 
only in some of the specifications. All of these coefficients have the predicted signs. 
Conversely, the determinant related to tax shields is not significant.  
Since the aim of the paper is to analyze the speed of adjustment in firms that will 
receive VC prior to receiving treatment, we now focus on the coefficient of the 
interaction between VC and the lagged debt ratio (i.e., 𝛽3). In Model 2 we report the 
coefficients of our baseline model. Model 3 eliminates the proxy for growth 
opportunities, which is intangible fixed assets over total assets, to control for potential 
problems with tangible fixed assets. Alternatively, Model 4 eliminates tangible fixed 
assets but keeps intangible fixed assets. Models 5 and 6 eliminate both the effective tax 
rate, which is not significant in any of the specifications and intangible fixed assets 
(Model 5) or tangible fixed assets (Model 6). Despite the alterations made the 
coefficients of the determinants used in those specifications do not show important 
changes, and keep their original signs and significance levels, except in the case of 
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tangible fixed assets. Even volatility becomes significant at least at the 10% level with 
the expected negative sign.  
The coefficient 𝛽1 in Models 2 to 6, which now reports the adjustment costs in 
control group firms, is cut by half in relation to the value estimated for all firms. This 
coefficient now shows values ranging from 0.2475 to 0.2782 (average = 0.2608), all of 
them significant at the 5% level. This implies that the average speed of adjustment in 
control group firms is 0.7392. Regarding the coefficient of the interaction between VC 
and the lagged debt ratio, we find that it is positive and statistically significant at the 1% 
level in all our specifications. The coefficient is also economically significant, with the 
values ranging from 0.4665 to 0.4740 (average = 0.4692) in Models 2 to 6. This means 
that the average adjustment costs in the case of sample firms is 0.7300 (i.e., 
0.2608+0.4692) and the speed of adjustment is 0.2700. In sum, we find that the 
difference in the speed of adjustment is statistically and economically significant among 
firms that will receive VC later and the matched control group firms, thus lending 
support to our hypothesis. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
Finally, it is interesting to jointly discuss the coefficients related to the variables 
that include the dummy VC (𝛽2 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽3), and which attempt to capture heterogeneous 
patterns between VC and the control group firms that stem from differences in the 
degree of persistence (autoregressive coefficient, 𝛽3) and the level (constant, 𝛽2) of the 
series. The fact that 𝛽2 is not significant, while 𝛽3 is, is consistent with the descriptive 
statistics showing that VC backed firms exhibit larger debt ratios. The panel-data 
estimates hide the reasons underlying this sample feature, showing that these 
differences are exclusively due to a greater degree of persistence (as measured by the 
size of the autoregressive coefficient) and not caused by differences in the level. In 
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other words, whereas the debt ratio of control group firms quickly reverts to a mean 
value and bounces randomly around it, it takes extended time for the debt ratio of VC 
backed firms to mean-revert to the mean, which consistently explains why the latter 
firms show greater unconditional means, everything else being constant.
11
 
5. Robustness checks and alternative explanations 
In Table 5 we show the regression results on our baseline model using other 
definitions found in the literature for our independent variables. First, we modify the 
definition of 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 , computing the ratio between tangible fixed assets plus inventories 
and total assets (e.g., Titman and Wessels 1988; Sogorb-Mira 2005). The coefficients 𝛽1 
and 𝛽3 are 0.2547 (significant at the 5% level) and 0.4560 (significant at the 1% level), 
respectively, meaning that the speed of adjustment in sample firms is 0.2893 compared 
to 0.7453 in control group firms. We also try an alternative definition for 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡  and 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 , using as reference the earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation rather than 
the EBIT (e.g., see Titman and Wessels 1988; Hovakimian et al. 2001; Ozkan 2001). 
When we replace both variables in our baseline model we find that the speed of 
adjustment of control group firms is 0.7427 whereas it is 0.2819 in the case of sample 
firms. The values do not change significantly when we alternatively replace the original 
definition of 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡  or 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡  while keeping the original definition of the other. As 
alternative proxy for 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡𝑕𝑖𝑡  we compute revenue growth divided by revenues in the 
previous year (e.g., Chittenden et al. 1996; López-Gracia and Sogorb-Mira 2008). In 
this case, the speed of adjustment in control group firms is 0.7218 whereas it is 0.2568 
in sample firms. Finally, we replace tangible fixed assets and intangible fixed assets 
with a variable that is the sum of tangible and intangible fixed assets. In this 
specification the speed of adjustment is 0.7419 in control group firms and 0.2585 in 
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sample firms. In all these regressions 𝛽1 and 𝛽3 were significant at the 5% and at the 1% 
level, respectively.  
Insert Table 5 about here 
We also repeat the estimations of the specifications included in Table 4 using an 
alternative dependent variable. In order to control for the potential effect of excluding 
accounts payable in the numerator (Welch 2011), we define the endogenous variable 
following the alternative solution proposed by Rajan and Zingales (1995): long- plus 
short-term debt divided by total assets minus accounts payable and other non-financial 
liabilities. In Table 6 we show that the speed of adjustment in control group firms in the 
baseline model (i.e., Model 1) is 0.6499. Regarding firms that receive VC, 𝛽3 is 0.4066 
and the estimated speed of adjustment is 0.2433. Considering all specifications in Table 
6, the average speed of adjustment is 0.6322 in control group firms and an average 
coefficient of 𝛽3 of 0.4011. Hence, the average speed of adjustment in firms that receive 
VC later is 0.2310, which is broadly similar to that shown in Table 4. 
Insert Table 6 about here 
6. Discussion and conclusions 
The VC literature has deeply analyzed the desired characteristics of prospective 
investee firms from the perspective of VC firms. Nevertheless, not so frequently it 
analyzes the real characteristics of firms that effectively obtain VC funding. VC is a 
financial instrument that aims to fill the equity gap in SMEs, which have a limited 
access to long-term funding. In this work we shed light on the financial characteristics 
of firms prior to receiving VC funding. In particular, we analyze the financial 
characteristics of firms that obtained VC at a later date to investigate whether they 
experience a low speed of adjustment in the years before receiving treatment. This 
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approach provides evidence on whether these firms are financially constrained or not by 
looking at the speed of adjustment to their target debt ratios. As far as we are aware, 
there is no previous evidence on this issue in the literature for firms that later receive 
VC. The existing literature on VC just focused on evidencing financial constraints 
through the existence of a significant sensitivity between investments and internal cash 
flow in firms prior to obtaining VC. But this approach has raised extensive discussions 
in the literature. 
We focus on a representative sample of 237 Spanish unlisted firms that received 
VC between 1995 and 2007 and compare the results with a one-by-one matched sample 
of firms that did not receive VC funding. In our results we find that treated firms show a 
significant lower speed of adjustment than their matched peers (i.e., 0.2700 in sample 
firms versus 0.7392 in control group firms). This result is robust to different 
specifications of the baseline model and to alternative definitions of the dependent and 
independent variables. The high speed of adjustment found in control group firms, 
which is close to that found in Spanish listed firms by De Miguel and Pindado (2001), 
could be reflecting that those firms neglect to take advantage of their growth 
opportunities. In this way they may adjust to the target debt level simply because they 
discard new investments, as the stable debt ratio reflects in our descriptive statistics. In 
contrast, sample firms that attract VC funding have sound growth opportunities and, 
simultaneously, their managers are willing to access any external source available. 
Therefore, their managers seem to be more concerned about funding the required 
investments than about adjusting the firm’s debt ratio to a target level. In this way, VC 
becomes an alternative long-term funding source that helps investee firms balance their 
debt ratios. The difference found in the speed of adjustment between both groups of 
firms is consistent with prior studies that show that firms that later access VC funding 
 24 
 
 
are probably more financially constrained, thus affecting their capacity to rebalance the 
capital structure. 
Several implications derive from the results obtained in this paper. For growing 
firms, those able to take advantage of growth opportunities should approach VC firms 
to carry out the required investments to avoid being financially constrained or, else, to 
be forced to abandon their growth prospects. Regarding policy makers, our findings 
provide further evidence on the role that VC firms play in high-growth unlisted firms, as 
a source of external funds that help them by reducing the dependency on the internally 
generated funds. We provide a financial explanation on why growing unlisted Spanish 
firms approach, or are attracted by, VC firms, overcoming their natural reluctance to 
allow an external investor to become a shareholder of the firm. 
For further research it would be interesting to test whether this significant 
difference in the speed of adjustment to the target debt level of those two groups of 
companies (i.e., those that obtain or do not obtain/seek VC funding) is also present in 
US unlisted firms. Second, it would be important to analyze whether the high speed of 
adjustment found in unlisted firms that do not obtain/seek VC funding is explained by 
the abandonment of investment opportunities to avoid an undesirable debt level. Finally, 
it would be interesting to test how the speed of adjustment and the capital structure 
determinants change after the VC investment. 
Footnotes 
1
 Other theories based on the market situation, such as market timing (Baker and Wurgler 2002) 
or "Inertia" (Welch 2004), have been proposed in recent years to explain the behavior of capital 
structure. 
2 
Flannery and Hankins (2007) argue that the cost of external financing sources and financial 
constraints affect the rebalancing costs for the debt ratio. However, we think that the former 
affects the availability of funds for the firm, which could be reflected in the financial constraints 
that the company faces. 
3
 Companies at the expansion stage are defined as existing firms with at least one profitable line 
of business that seek external funding to finance the access to new markets or the introduction 
of new products. 
4
 This database records information on 1,202,363 Spanish firms. 
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5
 In some cases we did not find a similar firm in the same region, in terms of industry, size and 
age. In these cases we selected a firm from another Spanish region in which the average income 
per capita was similar. 
6
 This was to be expected, since we do not consider in the sample young firms at the expansion 
stage because data on six consecutive years just before the initial investment are not available. 
7
 This coefficient is assumed to be constant across companies. Nevertheless, it is probable that 
each firm has an individual coefficient due to its individual specific characteristics. 
8
 As in Kayhan and Titman (2007), we simplify the specification of the adjustment costs by 
assuming that both leverage increasing and decreasing adjustments are symmetric. Byoun 
(2008) analyzed the differences in the adjustment process according to whether the firm had 
above-target (below-target) debt with a financial surplus (deficit). 
9
 This category includes short-term interest bearing debt, long-term bank loans, long-term debt 
issued by other firms belonging to the same corporate group, obligations related to leasing 
contracts and other long-term debt. This latter category would include all bonds issued by the 
firm, including convertible bonds. However, the breakdown into these categories is not 
available. 
10
 According to Berger and Udell (1998), both firm characteristics affect the sources of funds 
available. It is important to highlight this fact because the differences found in the financing 
behavior should be explained by other factors. 
11
 Note that for a stationary AR(1) process 𝑌𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝜌𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡 , it follows that ( )
1
t
c
E Y



. 
Hence, the unconditional mean tends to be greater for larger values of the level c, and/or larger 
values of 𝜌. In the limit in which   equals one, the process is driven by a random walk with a 
drift and the unconditional mean is infinite. 
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Table 1. Mean of sales, headcount, total assets and age in the sample 
Group Number Sales* Employees Assets* Age** 
Panel A-Comparison firms later receive VC: population vs. sample 
Population 757 27,195 180 23,867 12.593 
Sample 237 25,461 185 22,865 18.515 
 p-value 0.7873 0.9132 0.8199 0.0000 
Panel B-Comparison sample: later receive VC vs. Control Group 
Later receive VC 237 25,461 185 22,865 18.515 
Control Group 237 22,955 153 17,382 17.404 
 p-value 0.6501 0.5191 0.1969 0.2951 
Data refers to the year before the VC investment event. 
*Thousand constant 2005 Euros. 
** In years. 
Source: Amadeus Database. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Panel A. Debt ratio: Whole period before the initial VC investment (from T-5 to T) 
 Obs. # Firms Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
        
All firms 2,934 474 0.2115 0.1737 0.1870 0.0000 0.9087 
Later receive VC 1,489 237 0.2492 0.2378 0.1824 0.0000 0.8568 
Control Group 1,445 237 0.1727 0.1129 0.1837 0.0000 0.9087 
p-value   0.0000 0.0000    
 
Panel B. Debt ratio: Year by year evolution prior to the initial VC investment (from T-5 to T) 
   T T-1 T-2 T-3 T-4 T-5 
        
Mean values        
Later receive VC  0.2823 0.2654 0.2522 0.2409 0.2352 0.2252 
Control Group  0.1702 0.1753 0.1778 0.1708 0.1695 0.1620 
 p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0024 
Median values        
Later receive VC  0.2862 0.2542 0.2421 0.2176 0.2143 0.2186 
Control Group   0.1191 0.1183 0.1154 0.1143 0.1085 0.0886 
 p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Panel C. Independent variables: Whole period before the initial VC investment (from T-5 to T) 
Variable Group Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Tang All firms 2,934 0.1917
***
 0.1350
***
 0.1902
***
 0.0000
***
 0.9240
***
 
 Later receive VC 1,489 0.2507
***
 0.2110
***
 0.1907
***
 0.0000
***
 0.9240
***
 
 Control Group 1,445 0.1309
***
 0.0511
***
 0.1694
***
 0.0000
***
 0.9220
***
 
Size All firms 2,934 15.4525
***
 15.4065
***
 1.4717
***
 8.8537
***
 20.2716
***
 
 Later receive VC 1,489 15.5108
**
 15.4512
*
 1.4443
***
 8.8537
***
 20.2716
***
 
 Control Group 1,445 15.3924
***
 15.3205
***
 1.4975
***
 11.4076
***
 19.6797
***
 
Prof All firms 2,934 0.0671
***
 0.0609
***
 0.1024
***
 -0.9536
***
 0.7111
***
 
 Later receive VC 1,489 0.0583
***
 0.0568
***
 0.1028
***
 -0.9536
***
 0.6168
***
 
 Control Group 1,445 0.0761
***
 0.0653
***
 0.1012
***
 -0.6222
***
 0.7111
***
 
Vol All firms 2,934 2.1030
***
 0.4232
***
 11.5574
***
 0.0001
***
 215.4583
***
 
 Later receive VC 1,489 2.3706
*
 0.4150 12.4227
***
 0.0002
***
 207.3391
***
 
 Control Group 1,445 1.8272
***
 0.4258
***
 10.5892
***
 0.0001
***
 215.4583
***
 
GO All firms 2,934 0.0606
***
 0.0161
***
 0.1101
***
 0.0000
***
 0.9886
***
 
 Later receive VC 1,489 0.0642
**
 0.0233
***
 0.1020
***
 0.0000
***
 0.8421
***
 
 Control Group 1,445 0.0569
***
 0.0108
***
 0.1178
***
 0.0000
***
 0.9885
***
 
ETR All firms 2,934 0.2467
***
 0.2984
***
 0.1902
***
 0.0000
***
 1.0000
***
 
 Later receive VC 1,489 0.2300
***
 0.2700
***
 0.1962
***
 0.0000
***
 1.0000
***
 
 Control Group 1,445 0.2639
***
 0.3080
***
 0.1823
***
 0.0000
***
 1.0000
***
 
Data refers to all years in the sample before the initial VC investment event (from T-5 to T). T is the year 
before the firm received the first VC round, and the year of matching. 
Debt Ratio: ratio between long- plus short-term debt and total assets. 
Independent variables: Tang: Ratio between tangible fixed assets and total assets. Size: Natural logarithm of 
total assets; Prof: Ratio between EBIT and total assets. Vol: Moving standard deviation of the change in 
EBIT, computing the current and the two previous years. GO: Ratio between intangible assets and total 
assets. ETR: Ratio between the effective corporate tax paid and the earnings before tax. 
Differences in means (t- test) and medians (chi-squared test statistic) are reported: firms that later receive VC 
vs. firms that not receive. Significance at levels ***1%, **5%, *10%. 
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Table 3. Correlation matrix 
  Tang Size Prof Vol GO ETR NDTS 
Tang 1.0000       
Size 0.1102 1.0000      
Prof -0.0578 -0.0491 1.0000     
Vol 0.0037 -0.0103 -0.1224 1.0000    
GO -0.1286 -0.0123 -0.1339 0.1105 1.0000   
ETR -0.0611 -0.0118 0.2159 -0.0506 -0.0778 1.0000  
Definition of variables. Tang: Ratio between tangible fixed assets and total assets. Size: Natural 
logarithm of total assets. Prof: Ratio between EBIT and total assets. Vol: Moving standard 
deviation of the change in EBIT, computing the current and the previous two years. GO: Ratio 
between intangible assets and total assets. ETR: Ratio between the effective corporate tax paid and 
the earnings before tax. 
Significant values at the 5 percent level in bold. 
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Table 4. Regression results: total debt ratio 
Var. Sign Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  
              Debtt-1 + 0.5011 
***
 0.2511 
**
 0.2755 
**
 0.2475 
**
 0.2782 
**
 0.2518 
*
 
  (0.0823) (0.1272) (0.1305) (0.1266)  (0.1325) (0.1293) 
VC  -0.0145 -0.0959 -0.0978 -0.0808  -0.1017 
*
 -0.0842 
  (0.0776) (0.0603) (0.0603) (0.0573)  (0.0607) (0.0577) 
Debtt-1*VC +  0.4700 
***
 0.4666 
***
 0.4665 
***
 0.4740 
***
 0.4690 
***
 
   (0.1712) (0.1692) (0.1687)  (0.1724) (0.1718) 
Tang + 0.1161 
**
 0.0842 0.0778   0.0764   
  (0.0507) (0.0515) (0.0506)   (0.0504)   
Size + 0.0563 
***
 0.0504 
***
 0.0512 
***
 0.0510 
***
 0.0511 
***
 0.0512 
***
 
  (0.0096) (0.0090) (0.0089) (0.0089)  (0.0088) (0.0089) 
Prof - -0.1881 
***
 -0.1789 
***
 -0.1713 
***
 -0.1856 
***
 -0.1696 
***
 -0.1847 
***
 
  (0.0484) (0.0501) (0.0529) (0.0501)  (0.0528) (0.0500) 
Vol - -0.0008 -0.0008 
*
 -0.0006 
*
 -0.0008 
**
 -0.0006 
*
 -0.0008 
**
 
  (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)  (0.0004) (0.0004) 
GO + 0.2848 
***
 0.2492 
***
  0.2429 
***
  0.2406 
***
 
  (0.0758) (0.0635)  (0.0630)   (0.0621) 
ETR + 0.0009 -0.0033 -0.0023 -0.0042    
  (0.0168) (0.0175) (0.0178) (0.0177)    
Industry  0.0418 0.0958 0.0685 0.1053  0.0609 0.0971 
  (0.1063) (0.1037) (0.0979) (0.1028)  (0.0977) (0.1028) 
Time 
dummies 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
Constant  -0.7600 
***
 -0.6430 
***
 -0.6367 
***
 -0.6429 
***
 -0.6337 
***
 -0.6434 
***
 
  (0.1451) (0.1355) (0.1319) (0.1340)  (0.1316) (0.1329) 
Observations  2,934 2,934 2,934  2,934  2,934  2,934 
# Firms  474 474 474  474  474  474 
m1  -4.4734 -4.1897 -4.3669 -4.1743  -4.3536  -4.1696 
p-value  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
m2  0.9241 0.8998 0.9420 0.8639  0.9364  0.8558 
p-value  (0.3555) (0.3683) (0.3462) (0.3876)  (0.3490)  (0.3921) 
Sargan  67.9192 106.8764 100.2933 105.7032  100.4919  106.2630 
p-value  (0.1133) (0.1541) (0.2843) (0.1735)  (0.2797)  (0.1640) 
Regressions are estimated using the Blundell and Bond GMM estimator for panel data. 
Period analyzed: t varies from T-5 until T, with T being the year before the initial VC round. 
Dependent variable: Ratio between long- plus short-term debt and total assets. Independent Variables. 
Tang: Ratio between tangible fixed assets and total assets. Size: Natural logarithm of total assets. Prof: 
Ratio between EBIT and total assets. Vol: Moving standard deviation of the change in EBIT, computing 
the current and the two previous years. GO: Ratio between intangible assets and total assets. ETR: Ratio 
between the effective corporate tax paid and the earnings before tax. Industry: median leverage per year 
and industry. m1 and m2: first and second order serial correlation test, respectively. Sargan: Sargan test of 
the overidentifying restrictions. Robust standard errors in brackets. Sign: shows the predicted sign of the 
variable. 
Significance at levels *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. 
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Table 5. Robustness checks: alternative independent variables 
Var. Sign Model 7  Model 8  Model 9  Model 
10 
 Model 11  Model 
12 
 
Debtt-1 + 0.2547 
**
 0.2573 
**
 0.2544 
** 0.2545 
**
 0.2782 
**
 0.2581 
**
 
  (0.1256) (0.1278) (0.1254)  (0.1298) (0.1291) (0.1310) 
VC  -0.0860 -0.0918 -0.0942  -0.0925 -0.0988 -0.1083 
  (0.0585) (0.0610) (0.0597)  (0.0615) (0.0609) (0.0662) 
Debtt-1*VC + 0.4560 
***
 0.4608 
***
 0.4680 
*** 0.4620 
***
 0.4649 
***
 0.4834 
***
 
  (0.1683) (0.1717) (0.1693)  (0.1737) (0.1682) (0.1724) 
Tang +  0.0993 
*
 0.0900 
*
 0.0932 
*
 0.0719  
   (0.0517) (0.0511) (0.0523) (0.0508)  
Tang2 + 0.0261        
  (0.0312)        
Fixed +       0.1372 
***
 
        (0.0435) 
Size + 0.0517 
***
 0.0521 
***
 0.0477 
*** 0.0548 
***
 0.0521 
***
 0.0520 
***
 
  (0.0090) (0.0106) (0.0089)  (0.0109) (0.0087) (0.0106) 
Prof - -0.1826 
***
    -0.1810 
***
 -0.1674 
***
 -0.1809 
***
 
  (0.0484)    (0.0504) (0.0531) (0.0519) 
Prof2 -  
 
-0.1841 
***
 -0.1814 
***  
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
(0.0474) (0.0475)   
 
 
 
 
 
Vol - -0.0008 
**
  -0.0008 
*  -0.0006 
*
  
  (0.0004)  (0.0004)   (0.0004)  
Vol2 -  -0.0002   -0.0002  -0.0002 
   (0.0007)   (0.0007)  (0.0007) 
GO + 0.2475 
***
 0.2548 
***
 0.2542 
***
 0.2501 
***
   
  (0.0630) (0.0678) (0.0633)  (0.0678)   
GO2 +      -0.0058   
       (0.0037)   
ETR + -0.0037 -0.0072 -0.0048  -0.0058 -0.0027  -0.0036 
  (0.0176) (0.0178) (0.0175)  (0.0178) (0.0177)  (0.0182) 
Industry  0.1047 0.0789 0.0926  0.0824 0.0702 0.0746 
  (0.1028) (0.1037) (0.1044)  (0.1032) (0.0987) (0.1000) 
Time 
dummies 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
Constant  -0.6611 
***
 -0.6624 
***
 -0.5972 
*** -0.7079 
***
 -0.6505 
***
 -0.6670 
***
 
  (0.1337) (0.1568) (0.1349)  (0.1607) (0.1293) (0.1557) 
Observations  2,934 2,934 2,934  2,934 2,934  2,934 
# Firms  474 474 474  474 474  474 
m1  -4.4644 -4.2042 -4.1822 -4.2109 -4.3397  -4.2635 
p-value  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
m2  0.8965 0.9220 0.9176 0.9055 0.9525  0.9014 
p-value  (0.3700) (0.3565) (0.3588) (0.3652) (0.3408)  (0.3674) 
Sargan  69.9028 109.6552 107.5328 109.4218 100.3204  104.0836 
p-value  (0.0850) (0.1144) (0.1439) (0.1174) (0.2837)  (0.2030) 
Regressions are estimated using the Blundell and Bond GMM estimator for panel data. 
Period analyzed: t varies from T-5 until T, with T being the year before the initial VC round. 
Dependent variable: Ratio between long plus short term debt and total assets. Independent 
Variables. Tang: Ratio between tangible fixed assets and total assets. Tang2: Ratio between tangible 
fixed assets plus inventories and total assets. Fixed: Ratio between fixed assets and total assets. Size: 
Natural logarithm of total assets. Prof: Ratio between EBIT and total assets. Prof2: Ratio between 
EBITDA and total assets. Vol: Moving standard deviation of the change in EBIT, computing the 
current and the two previous years; Vol2: Same procedure using EBITDA. GO: Ratio between 
intangible assets and total assets. GO2: Ratio between revenue growth and revenues in the previous 
year. ETR: Ratio between the effective corporate tax paid and the earnings before tax. Industry: 
median leverage per year and industry group. m1 and m2: first and second order serial correlation 
test, respectively. Sargan: Sargan test of the overidentifying restrictions. Robust standard errors in 
brackets. Sign: shows the predicted sign of the variable. 
Significance at levels *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. 
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Table 6. Robustness checks: adjusted total debt ratio as dependent variable 
Var. Sign Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  
              Debtt-1 + 0.5631 
***
 0.3501 
**
 0.3889 
**
 0.3440 
**
 0.4016 
**
 0.3545 
**
 
  (0.0717) (0.1619) (0.1650) (0.1616) (0.1651) (0.1624) 
VC  0.0643 -0.0948 0.0900 -0.0875 -0.0902 -0.0896 
  (0.1001) (0.0810) (0.0828) (0.0807) (0.0827) (0.0813) 
Debtt-1*VC +  0.4066 
*
 0.3890 
*
 0.4136 
*
 0.3862 
*
 0.4103 
*
 
   (0.2207) (0.2208) (0.2197) (0.2209) (0.2217) 
Tang + 0.0555 0.0649 0.0484  0.0446   
  (0.0605) (0.0596) (0.0597)  (0.0612)   
Size + 0.0661 
***
 0.0575 
***
 0.0585 
***
 0.0575 
***
 0.0596 
***
 0.0585 
***
 
  (0.0164) (0.0135) (0.0136) (0.0136) (0.0138) (0.0136) 
Prof - -0.2193 
***
 -0.1623 
***
 -0.1597 
***
 -0.1654 
***
 -0.1568 
**
 -0.1647 
***
 
  (0.0604) (0.0594) (0.0622) (0.0585) (0.0621) (0.0583) 
Vol - -0.0007 -0.0008 
*
 -0.0007 -0.0008 
*
 -0.0006 -0.0008 
*
 
  (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) 
GO + 0.2464 
***
 0.2687 
***
  0.2660 
***
  0.2631 
***
 
  (0.0761) (0.0694)  (0.0693)  (0.0685) 
ETR + -0.0006 -0.0085 -0.0040 -0.0092   
  (0.0210) (0.0220) (0.0222) (0.0218)   
Industry  0.1692 
*
 0.1651 
*
 0.1772 
*
 0.1597 0.2098 
*
 0.1816 
  (0.0984) (0.0989) (0.1020) (0.0983) (0.1237) (0.1133) 
Time 
dummies 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
Constant  -1.0245 
***
 -0.8277 
***
 -0.8451 
***
 -0.8131 
***
 -0.8905 
***
 -0.8478 
***
 
  (0.2576) (0.2162) (0.2218) (0.2162) (0.2397) (0.2262) 
Observations  2,934 2,934 2,934  2,934 2,934  2,934 
# Firms  474 474 474  474 474  474 
m1  -5.5500 -5.2044 -5.3886 -5.2046 -5.4126  -5.2041 
p-value  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
m2  0.7813 0.7580 0.7921 0.7350 0.7906  0.7173 
p-value  (0.4346) (0.4485) (0.4283) (0.4623) (0.4292)  (0.4732) 
Sargan  72.4526 103.6983 103.0169 102.8029 103.4093  103.3361 
p-value  (0.0574) (0.2105) (0.2242) (0.2286) (0.2162)  (0.2177) 
Regressions are estimated using the Blundell and Bond GMM estimator for panel data. 
Period analyzed: t includes from T-5 until T, with T being the year before the initial VC round. 
Dependent variable: Ratio between long- plus short-term debt divided by total assets minus accounts 
payable. Independent Variables. Tang: Ratio between tangible fixed assets and total assets. Size: Natural 
logarithm of total assets. Prof: Ratio between EBIT and total assets. Vol: Moving standard deviation of 
the change in EBIT, computing the current and the two previous years. GO: Ratio between intangible 
assets and total assets. ETR: Ratio between the effective corporate tax paid and the earnings before tax. 
Industry: median leverage per year and industry. m1 and m2: first and second order serial correlation test, 
respectively. Sargan: Sargan test of the overidentifying restrictions. Robust standard errors in brackets. 
Sign: shows the predicted sign of the variable. 
Significance at levels *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. 
 
